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Research on choice over time has found that people tend to focus on concrete aspects of near-future events and abstract aspects of distantfuture events. Furthermore, a focus on concrete aspects heightens the feasibility-related components, whereas a focus on abstract aspects heightens the desirability-related components, which can lead to preference inconsistency over time. In this research, the authors integrate research on choice over time with mental simulation. They propose and show that counter to people's natural tendencies, outcome simulation for near-future events and process simulation for distant-future events lead to preference consistency over time. The results also suggest that outcome timing moderates the effectiveness of process versus outcome simulation.
Mental Simulation and Preference Consistency over Time: The Role of Process-Versus Outcome-Focused Thoughts
Consider the following scenario: A person has just returned from a wonderful trip in which she took a lot of digital pictures. She is planning to create a digital photo album for this trip and decides to wait for the next three-day weekend to complete the album (which occurs next month). After reading a review of various software packages, she selects one with a high-quality rating, numerous designed themes, and advanced layout tools that should take a moderate amount of time and effort to learn and complete the album. However, four weeks later, when the time to create the photo album arrives, she focuses on the effort associated with installing and learning this software and, ultimately, opts for a simpler software package that can be installed and learned more easily but has relatively limited functionality.
The question whether choosing the simpler software package is a better or worse decision is not the focus of this research. Rather, our interest lies in understanding the mental processes that are associated with selecting an option (simpler software package) that is inconsistent with the original preference (advanced software package). Furthermore, we propose and test a method for reducing this preference inconsistency by changing consumers' mental representations of an event using mental simulation. We use our findings to understand preference formation over time and the relationship between two types of mental simulation: process-focused and outcome-focused simulation.
As the preceding scenario illustrates and research on choice over time demonstrates (e.g., Soman 1998; Trope and Liberman 2003) , temporal distance influences consumers' preferences. Specifically, Trope and Liberman (2003) show that people tend to focus on concrete aspects of near-future events and abstract aspects of distant-future events. When making a decision that has immediate consequences, people think in more concrete terms and put more weight on low-level components of an option (i.e., how feasible the option is). However, when people make a decision about something that is in the more distant future, they tend to think in more abstract terms and focus on the high-level components of an option (i.e., how desirable a certain option is). This shift in consideration has been shown to lead to temporally inconsistent preferences (Trope and Liberman 2003) .
What might moderate such temporally inconsistent preferences? Suppose that counter to the natural (default) consideration pattern, people are encouraged to think about the concrete, step-by-step feasibility-related aspects of the software packages (e.g., imagining the steps involved to download, install, and learn the software packages) when they make their choice for the distant future. Would this change their preferences such that their distant-future choice is consistent with what they would prefer when the choice is imminent? Conversely, what if people are encouraged to think about the more abstract desirability-related aspects of the software packages (e.g., imagining how they would feel after their digital photo album is created) when they make their choice for the immediate future? Would this lead to changes in their preference such that their current choice would be consistent with the choice they had indicated when the decision was in the distant future? These questions are important because consumers (firms) are interested in maximizing long-term happiness (customer satisfaction). Emerging research on the differences between process-focused and outcome-focused simulation (e.g., Escalas and Luce 2003, 2004; Taylor et al. 1998 ) may shed some light on ways to prevent inconsistent preferences.
In the current research, our main objective is to integrate theory from the mental simulation literature with the processes that lead to time-inconsistent preferences and to propose systematic mental strategies to achieve preference consistency. We propose and demonstrate that outcome timing can help understand when each type of mental simulation, outcome or process, will be more effective in achieving preference consistency.
TIME AND MENTAL REPRESENTATION

Time-Inconsistent Preferences and Mental Representation
Time-dependent changes in preferences have been investigated across different areas in the behavioral and social sciences, including behavioral decision making (e.g., Thaler 1981) , delay of gratification (e.g., Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez 1989) , and self-control (e.g., Rachlin 1995) . Although research on preference inconsistency has offered mostly affective mechanisms to explain temporal shifts (e.g., Ainslie and Haslam 1992; Loewenstein 1996) , recent theories have focused more on cognitive processes (e.g., Malkoc and Zauberman 2006; Trope and Liberman 2003; Zauberman and Lynch 2005) . In particular, construal-level theory (Liberman and Trope 1998; Liberman 2000, 2003) proposes that temporal distance changes people's responses to future events by changing the way people mentally represent those events. Events in the distant future are more likely to be represented in terms of abstract and central features (high-level construals). However, events in the near future are more likely to be represented in terms of concrete and peripheral features (low-level construals). This shift in mental representation can change attribute weights over time (Liberman and Trope 1998; Soman 1998 Soman , 2003 and alter the decision process (Förster, Friedman, and Liberman 2004; Malkoc, Zauberman, and Ulu 2005) .
The temporal shift in how people represent events and process information has important implications for the consistency of preferences over time. For the purpose of our current work, an important difference between high-level and low-level mental representations is the resulting relative importance of desirability versus feasibility considerations (Liberman and Trope 1998) . Desirability refers to the value of an action's end state, whereas feasibility refers to the ease or difficulty of the means to reach the end state. Construal-level theory predicts that temporal distance increases desirability-related mental representations and decreases feasibility-related mental representations (Liberman and Trope 1998; Liberman 2000, 2003) . As a result of this shift between desirability and feasibility, people may have temporally inconsistent preferences, preferring more desirable options for the distant future but more feasible options for the near future. For example, Liberman and Trope (1998) find that when asking students to choose a distant-future research assignment, the decision is dominated by the positive outcome of completing a project on an interesting topic, and students are willing to sacrifice ease for the sake of interest. However, when the assignment is due in the near future, the mental representation of the assignment is dominated by the amount of time and effort required to finish the project, and students choose an easy but uninteresting assignment.
Implications of Shifts in Mental Representations for Preference Consistency
Research on choice over time has suggested that intertemporal patterns of evaluation and preference can be altered if temporal construal is controlled (Trope and Liberman 2003) . To prevent the negative consequences of people neglecting the low-level aspects of an action in the distant future, the concrete details of distant-future events could be emphasized by requiring them to rehearse, practice, or plan distant-future tasks in full detail (Gollwitzer 1999; Trope and Liberman 2003) . Alternatively, the self-control literature has indicated that people's attention can be turned away from the concrete qualities of immediate temptation to focus on its abstract qualities (Baumeister and Heatherton 1996; Hoch and Lowenstein 1991; Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez 1989) .
To date, however, the idea of altering construal levels using mental control mechanisms has not received much attention in the literature on choice over time and selfregulation. Furthermore, theories of mental simulation focus mostly on goal attainment rather than on preferences over time. We use the notion of differing levels of representation to examine systematically the effect of different types of mental simulation on preferences.
PROCESS-VERSUS OUTCOME-FOCUSED MENTAL
SIMULATION Mental simulation is the imitative mental representation of an event or series of events (Taylor and Schneider 1989) . Prior research has distinguished between process simulation, which encourages people to imagine the step-by-step process of reaching a certain goal, and outcome simulation, which encourages people to think about the desirable outcome of fulfilling the goal (Taylor et al. 1998) . Multiple studies have shown that when people engage in processfocused simulation, their performance is superior to those who engage in outcome-focused simulation (Oettingen and Mayer 2002; Pham and Taylor 1999; Rivkin and Taylor 1999; Taylor et al. 1998) . For example, Pham and Taylor (1999) find that participants who engage in process simula-tion (i.e., visualizing themselves studying for an exam in a way that would lead them to obtain an "A") spend more time studying for the midterm and achieve a higher grade than participants who engage in outcome simulation (i.e., visualizing themselves receiving an "A" on the exam). In the consumer domain, Escalas and Luce (2003, 2004) show that process-focused advertisements facilitate behavioral intentions because of a spontaneous planning process, in which argument strength plays a moderating role.
Thus, the classic mental simulation research focuses more directly on performance (with the notable recent work of Escalas and Luce [2003, 2004] ), and the dominant findings have demonstrated superior performance under process simulation. We conjecture that when each type of mental simulation is implemented in research on choice over time, in which people need to make trade-offs between high-level desirability and low-level feasibility considerations, each type of mental simulation (process-focused and outcomefocused) might be more effective at a different point in time.
SIMULATION TYPE AND PREFERENCE CONSISTENCY
OVER TIME Combining ideas of process versus outcome simulation with ideas of levels of mental representation in the research on choice over time, we propose that process simulation encourages a low-level mental representation, highlighting the concrete feasibility-related aspects of an event. In contrast, outcome simulation encourages a high-level mental representation, highlighting the abstract desirability-related aspects of an event. With this association between these two theories in mind, we argue that the pattern of preference inconsistency over time could be attenuated by regulating the levels of mental representations with either process simulation or outcome simulation, depending on the temporal distance. In formulating our hypotheses, we compared the two types of simulation with the natural preference (i.e., no simulation) at different points in time (i.e., distant versus near future).
Near Future
For events in the immediate future, concrete feasibilityfocused mental representations are naturally evoked, and abstract desirability-related representations are neglected. As a result, process simulation, which redundantly focuses on concrete thoughts, may not be effective in shifting preferences to be consistent with those that naturally occur in a distant-future setting. However, an outcome simulation that focuses on the favorability of the event could activate the high-level representations and increase desirability-related considerations. As a result, outcome simulation for nearfuture events may lead to a change in people's preferences, making them more consistent with preferences that naturally arise when decisions for the more distant future are made.
H 1a : Compared with the natural near-future preference, outcome simulation for near-future events/options causes a greater change in preference than does process simulation. H 1b : Outcome simulation for the near future leads to greater preference consistency over time (i.e., making near-future preferences after outcome simulation more consistent with natural distant-future preferences).
Distant Future
For events in the distant future, abstract desirabilityfocused mental representations play a dominant role, and the concrete feasibility-focused representations are neglected. Thus, process simulation could activate concrete representations and increase the weight given to feasibilityrelated considerations of the event. As a result, process simulation for distant-future events may bring consumers' preferences closer to their preferences in the near future when the event is imminent. However, outcome simulation, which focuses on abstract desirability-related considerations, may not be effective in changing consumers' preferences, because it redundantly focuses on the naturally evoked high-level desirability-related thoughts about the distant-future event.
H 2a : Compared with the natural distant-future preference, process simulation for distant-future events/options causes a greater change in preference than does outcome simulation. H 2b : Process simulation for the distant future leads to greater preference consistency over time (i.e., making distantfuture preferences after process simulation more consistent with natural near-future preferences).
EMPIRICAL APPROACH We test our hypotheses in two experiments that examine the ability of outcome and process simulation to overcome preference inconsistency over time. In Experiment 1, we adapted a basic assignment choice scenario used in prior research on temporal construal (Liberman and Trope 1998) . This enabled us to replicate the existing findings and then to isolate the impact of simulation type. In Experiment 2, we use a multiattribute consumer product (a photo album software package) to test the impact of mental simulation type in an environment that requires consumers to trade off their effort for product performance. The general task in both experiments involves evaluating two options that are associated with different levels of feasibility and desirability. In addition, consistent with prior research (e.g., Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2000) , the timing manipulation had participants making the evaluation either in the near future (today or in a couple of days, depending on the task) or in the distant future (two or three months later).
Importantly, in both experiments, before evaluating the options, participants in the simulation conditions performed mental simulation that focused on either the process or the outcome associated with each option. In the mental simulation literature, process simulation has focused on a series of steps, or tasks, that are intended to aid the completion of the focal goal (Taylor et al. 1998) . Conversely, participants in the outcome simulation condition focused on experiencing the feelings associated with achieving a positive outcome (Taylor et al. 1998 ).
In the consumer domain, Escalas and Luce (2004) adapt the traditional process and outcome simulation manipulations toward preference in an advertising context. In the process simulation conditions, participants were asked to "focus on how you would incorporate this shampoo (vitamins) into your daily routine" (Escalas and Luce 2004, pp. 282-83) . In the outcome simulation conditions, participants were asked, "Imagine how you would feel if your looks improved (health improved) as a result of the shampoo 
VANISHES WITH OUTCOME OR PROCESS SIMULATION
Notes: A higher score represents greater preferences for the higherfeasibility option.
(vitamins)" (Escalas and Luce 2004, p. 283) . Our manipulations of process and outcome simulation mirrored the language used in these prior manipulations.
The primary dependent variable in both experiments is the relative preference between the two options (we also included choice in Experiment 2). To test the hypotheses associated with a change in preference, we first computed a series of planned contrasts. To examine the impact of timing and simulation type further, we performed an additional analysis that combined theoretically similar conditions (control and process simulation in the near-future conditions or control and outcome simulation in the distantfuture conditions). These converging sets of analyses enabled us to test the relative effects of simulation type at different points in time. In Experiment 2, we supplement the preference data with choice and analyze the coding of participants' written simulation protocols.
EXPERIMENT 1 Method
Participants and design. A total of 189 students at a major southeastern university completed the experiment to fulfill a research requirement for an introductory marketing course. The experiment was a 2 (time: near future versus distant future) × 3 (simulation: control versus outcome simulation versus process simulation) between-subjects design.
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions. In all conditions, participants were asked to imagine that they needed to turn in a class assignment that required reading a chapter and discussing several questions about it (Liberman and Trope 1998) . There were two topics from which they could choose: Topic A was interesting but required a great deal of effort, and Topic B was less interesting but did not require as much effort. Each topic was described in general terms, and no specific information about the topics was given. The order of the two topics was counterbalanced.
Participants in the simulation conditions were asked to perform process or outcome simulation. Consistent with prior research (Escalas and Luce 2003, 2004) , process simulation instructions focused on the activities associated with completing the assignment, whereas outcome simulation instructions focused on the benefits associated with completing the assignment (for the exact wording, see the Appendix).
To ensure that participants performed the mental simulations, they were asked to write down a detailed list of their thoughts following the simulation exercise. After reading the scenario and performing the mental simulation exercise or just reading the scenario (in the control conditions), all participants were asked to indicate their likelihood of choosing that topic on a ten-point scale (1 = "extremely unlikely," and 10 = "extremely likely"). Subsequently, participants were asked to indicate their relative preference between these two topics (1 = "definitely Topic A," and 10 = "definitely Topic B"). In the near-future conditions, the assignment was due a week later, whereas in the distantfuture conditions, the assignment was due at the beginning of the next semester, which was about three months from the time participants completed the questionnaires.
1 Throughout the analyses sections, we used overall error terms and adjusted degrees of freedom for all statistical tests (Winer, Brown, and Michels 1991) . In addition, all ω 2 values cited in this article are partial ω 2 (Keren and Lewis 1979) , excluding variance due to analysis of variance terms unrelated to the tested effect. Partial ω 2 = σ 2 effect /(σ 2 effect + σ 2 error ).
Results
The main dependent measure was the relative preference between the high-feasibility and the high-desirability options. Note that higher scores represent greater preference for the higher-feasibility/lower-desirability option (the uninteresting but easy topic). In addition, note that a key feature of our design is that (1) the control conditions are hypothesized to change over time in accordance with prior research and (2) mental simulations are hypothesized to change preference at different points in time-that is, outcome simulation in the near future and process simulation in the distant future. Thus, to test our theoretical predictions, we present two sets of analyses.
The first analysis consists of a series of planned contrasts that match our hypotheses. The second analysis is a modified omnibus test that directly examines the moderating effect of timing on the effectiveness of process versus outcome simulation by simultaneously testing changes in preference by combining theoretically similar conditions. Complete details appear subsequently.
Replicating prior findings (control conditions). The pattern of results for the control conditions replicated prior findings (e.g., Liberman and Trope 1998) , with a marginally significant difference between near-and distant-future preferences (F(1, 183) = 3.00, p = .08, ω 2 = .032). 1 As we expected, participants in the near-future condition preferred the easier but less interesting topic (M = 6.87) more than those in the distant-future condition (M = 5.83) (see Figure  1) .
Near future. Planned contrasts demonstrate that for the near future, outcome simulation causes a change in prefer-ences and leads to temporal preference consistency with the natural distant-future preference: Participants who engaged in outcome simulation indicated a significantly greater preference for the interesting but difficult topic (M = 5.60) than those in the control condition (M = 6.87; F(1, 183) = 4.71, p < .05, ω 2 = .055). However, there was no significant difference regarding the relative preference between the process simulation condition (M = 6.73) and the control condition (M = 6.87; F(1, 183) = .06, p = .81). These results support H 1a . As a result of outcome simulation for the near future, the natural intertemporal preference inconsistency is eliminated. Preferences associated with outcome simulation for the near future (M = 5.60) were not significantly different from the control preference for the distant future (M = 5.83; F(1, 183) = .14, p = .71), in support of H 1b .
Distant future. For the distant future, process simulation causes a change in preferences and leads to preference consistency over time with the natural near-future preference. In the distant-future conditions, participants in the process simulation condition indicated a marginally significant greater preference for the less interesting but easier topic (M = 6.93) than those in the control condition (M = 5.83; F(1, 183) = 3.32, p < .07, ω 2 = .038). 2 However, the preferences associated with the outcome simulation condition (M = 5.73) were not significantly different from the control condition (M = 5.83; F(1, 183) = .07, p = .79). These results provide initial support for H 2a . As a result of process simulation for the distant future, the natural intertemporal preference inconsistency is eliminated. Preferences associated with process simulation for the distant future (M = 6.93) were not significantly different from the natural preference of the near future (M = 6.87; F(1, 183) = .01, p = .92), in support of H 2b .
Because our hypotheses are about a series of planned contrasts with the control condition shifting with time (near versus distant future), the two-degree-of-freedom omnibus interaction is not the appropriate test. However, because we hypothesize process simulation for near future and outcome simulation for distant future to match the respective default control conditions (match) and outcome simulation for near future and process simulation for distant future to cause preference deviation from the respective control conditions (mismatch), it is appropriate to test for a modified onedegree-of-freedom interaction by combining the control with the match conditions. Before testing for the modified interaction, we conducted two separate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for the match and mismatch conditions: First, we computed a 2 (near versus distant future) × 2 (control versus match) ANOVA. As expected, we found no main effects of simulation (F(1, 183) = .13, p = .71) or interaction between time and simulation (F(1, 183) = 0, p = .99). Second, we conducted a 2 (near versus distant future) × 2 (control versus mismatch) ANOVA. As expected, we found significant interactions between simulation and time (F(1, 183) = 7.94, p = .005). Thus, we combined our control with match conditions and performed a modified 2 (near future versus distant future) × 2 (match versus mismatch) ANOVA that tested for the unique (one degree of freedom) main effect at each point of time. We found a significant interaction between time and simulation (F(1, 185) = 11.07, p < .001).
Discussion
The results from the control conditions of Experiment 1 replicate prior findings (e.g., Liberman and Trope 1998) and demonstrate that people have a relatively stronger preference for the higher-feasibility option for the near future than for the distant future. In support of our hypotheses, the results further show that for the near future, outcome simulation caused a greater change in preference for the higherdesirability/lower-feasibility option (H 1a ), leading to preferences that were consistent with the control preference for the distant-future option (H 1b ). Conversely, for the distant future, process simulation created a greater preference change in favor of the higher-feasibility/lower-desirability option (H 2a ), leading to preferences that were consistent with those in the control condition for the near-future option (H 2b ).
Why is there no change in preference for process simulation in the near future and outcome simulation in the distant future? Our explanation focuses on the natural processing characteristics at each point in time. Thus, in the near-future scenario, process simulation enhances the dominant processing mode, in which the corresponding focus is on concrete feasibility-related thoughts. In contrast, outcome simulation enhances the dominant processing mode in the distant future by focusing on abstract desirability-related thoughts.
Experiment 1 provides direct evidence that process and outcome simulation can be used to change preferences and to create preference consistency over time. In the next study, we provide further evidence for these results by examining the phenomena in a more typical consumption context; we also increase the external validity by including choice as a dependent variable, and we increase the internal validity by using a more subtle and consistent manipulation of process and outcome simulation.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1 provides support for our hypotheses that use of process simulation for the distant future and outcome simulation for the near future can help attenuate preference inconsistency over time. However, the task of choosing an assignment may have idiosyncratic characteristics that limit our ability to generalize the findings to more typical consumer contexts. In Experiment 2, we switch to a different domain (i.e., the choice of a software package) to test whether the impact of process-and outcome-based thoughts generalizes to a consumption situation with a multiattribute product. In addition, we add choice as a dependent variable. Finally, we modify the simulation instructions so that they are more closely aligned with those used in the marketing literature (Escalas and Luce 2003, 2004) .
Method
Participants and design. A total of 225 students were recruited at a major southeastern university and were paid $5 as compensation. The experiment followed a 2 (time: near future versus distant future) × 3 (simulation: control versus outcome simulation versus process simulation) between-subjects design.
Stimuli. The basic scenario of the stimuli asked participants to imagine that they had an important project (to create a photo essay) for one of their classes that was due either in two days or at the beginning of the next semester, which was a little more than two months from the time participants completed the questionnaires. The project required the use of a photo album software package. There were two software packages from which participants could choose, both of which had free trial versions that could be downloaded from the Web and were valid for 48 hours. All projects were to be graded and then posted on the Web. Participants were asked to consider the following two options: One software package had a higher PC Magazine quality rating (rated 4.5 out of 5 stars) with complete image-editing features (e.g., numerous predesigned themes, improved layout tools). However, this package had a large file size and a medium difficulty level, for which downloading, installation, and the tutorial were estimated to take approximately 45 minutes. The other software package had a lower PC Magazine quality rating (rated 3 out of 5 stars) with some image-editing features (e.g., limited themes, basic layout tools). However, this package had a small file size and a low difficulty level, for which downloading, installation, and the tutorial were estimated to take approximately 10 minutes. Descriptions of both software packages also included an excerpt from a review: "allows for the creation of fabulous photo essays, but difficult and time consuming to learn and use" for the software package with advanced features and "some limitations of final layout and editing options, but simple to use, easy to learn, and gets the job done" for the more limited but easier-to-use software package. The order of the software packages was counterbalanced.
Procedure. The process simulation instructions focused on the process of using the software package, and the outcome simulation instructions focused on the final outcome of the project. In addition, instructions for the process and outcome simulations contained the same number of words (65) and the same structure (for the exact wording, see the Appendix). In this experiment, we used a similar procedure and dependent measures as in Experiment 1 but with some additional measures. First, in addition to the preference measure, we included participants' binary choice between the two options. Second, as a manipulation check for time, after the main task, we asked participants to rate their perceptions of the time gap between now and the due date of the project. Third, we asked participants to indicate how important the capabilities of the software and the difficulty of setting up and using the software were when they made their decision about which software package to choose. Finally, we asked participants to rate how much they thought about the process of using the software and the final quality of the project when they were making their decisions.
Results
As in Experiment 1, the main dependent measure was the relative preference between the high-feasibility and the high-desirability options. For the relative preference, higher scores represent greater preference for the higher-feasibility option (the software package that had a low-quality rating but was easier to use), and lower scores represent greater 3 The coding revealed that four participants did more than twice the opposite simulation than they were instructed to do, and thus we dropped them from the analysis, which resulted in a sample size of 221. The results based on all 225 participants (including those who did not follow the instructions) fully replicated the results based on 221 participants, except that the simple effect of process simulation in the distant future was not significant compared with the distant-future control condition. All other pairwise contrasts and the differencing analysis yielded the same results. To test the robustness of the results further, we used analyses with different criteria: We conducted analyses based on participants who (1) did not do more of the opposite simulation than the simulation that they were supposed to do (N = 213) and (2) did not do more than 1.5 times the opposite simulation (N = 214). The results fully replicated those based on 221 participants.
preference for the higher-desirability option (the software package that had a high-quality rating but was difficult to use). We report similar analyses as those in Experiment 1. In addition, we report the choice data, as well as coded results of participants' written responses to the simulation instructions. We asked three coders to assess participants' thought protocols independently to identify whether each argument was a process-or an outcome-related thought. The intercoder reliability was .95 for outcome-related thoughts and .91 for process-related thoughts. The coding results of three coders were aggregated. 3 Manipulation check. The coded open responses indicate that participants had more outcome-related thoughts in the outcome simulation conditions (M = 4.73) than in the process simulation conditions (M = 1.87; F(1, 140) = 161.68, p < .001) and that participants had more processrelated thoughts in the process simulation conditions (M = 4.05) than in the outcome simulation conditions (M = 1.62; F(1, 140) = 122.74, p < .005). This indicates that the simulation conditions had the intended effect on the type of thoughts participants generated and that participants performed overall similar levels of total elaboration for both types of simulation (F(1, 140) = 1.89, p = .17).
We further tested the effectiveness of our manipulations using participants' self-reports about the importance of process-and outcome-related features in their decisions. We calculated the difference between people's self-reported amount of thinking about the process of using the software and the final quality of the project and found a significant main effect of time (F(1, 215) = 4.02, p < .05) and a significant effect of simulation (F(2, 215) = 3.28, p < .05) but no significant interaction. We also found similar results for self-reported measures of the importance of the software's capability and the difficulty of setting up and using the software; this result shows that outcome simulation increases the importance of abstract desirability considerations, whereas process simulation increases the importance of concrete feasibility considerations.
In addition, the manipulation check measure of the temporal distance between now and the due date of the project confirmed that our time manipulation was successful. Participants perceived the time gap in the near-future conditions (M = 4.02) as significantly shorter than that in the distant-future conditions (M = 7.39; F(1, 219) = 168.58, p < .001).
Control conditions. Consistent with the predictions of prior research and the results in Experiment 1, under no simulation, participants in the near-future condition preferred the higher-feasibility software package (M = 7.13) significantly more than participants in the distant-future Near future. As in Experiment 1, we computed a set of planned contrasts to test the relative effectiveness of the different simulation types. Again, the results were fully consistent with our hypotheses. In the near-future conditions, there was no significant difference in the relative preference between the process simulation condition (M = 7.03) and the control condition (M = 7.13; F(1, 215) = .03, p = .86). However, participants who engaged in outcome simulation (M = 5.59) indicated a significantly greater preference for the higher-desirability software package than participants in the control condition (M = 7.13; F(1, 215) = 6.04, p < .05, ω 2 = .16), in support of H 1a . Furthermore, as we expected, preferences associated with outcome simulation for the near future (M = 5.59) were not significantly different from the control preference for the distant future (M = 5.42; F(1, 215) = .08, p = .78), indicating that the natural preference inconsistency over time was eliminated after outcome simulation for the near future, in support of H 1b .
Distant future. In the distant-future conditions, there was no difference in preferences between outcome simulation (M = 5.28) and the control condition (M = 5.42; F(1, 215) = .05, p = .82). However, after the process simulation, participants indicated a significantly greater preference for the higher-feasibility software package (M = 6.66) than participants in the control condition (M = 5.42; F(1, 215) = 3.76, p < .05, ω 2 = .266), in support of H 2a . Furthermore, as a result of process simulation for the distant future, the natural preference inconsistency over time was eliminated. There was no difference between the preferences after process simulation for the distant future (M = 6.66) and the control preference for the near future (M = 7.13; F(1, 215) = .55, p = .46), in support of H 2b .
As in Experiment 1, before combining the control and match conditions to test for the modified interaction, we ran two separate ANOVAs. The 2 (near versus distant future) × 2 (control versus match) ANOVA showed no main effect of simulation (F(1, 215) = .07, p = .79) or interactions between time and simulation (F(1, 215) = 0, p = .96). The 2 (near versus distant future) × 2 (control versus mismatch) ANOVA indicated a significant interaction between simulation and time (F(1, 215) = 9.64, p < .005). The modified 2 (near future versus distant future) × 2 (match versus mismatch) ANOVA showed a significant interaction between time and simulation (F(1, 217) = 12.89, p < .001), in support of our hypotheses.
Choice. For the choice between software packages, an overall chi-square test showed a significant difference between participants' choices across the six conditions (χ 2 (5) = 17.14, p < .005, ω 2 = .078). Overall, the results replicated the preference results. As we predicted, in the control conditions, the percentage of people who chose the higher-feasibility software package for the near future (M = 72%) was significantly greater than the percentage of people who chose the same software package for the distant future (M = 42%; χ 2 (1) = 6.93, p < .01, ω 2 = .09). In terms of the effect of mental simulation, when the choice was for the near future, the percentage of people who chose the higher-feasibility software package after process simulation (M = 78%) did not change compared with that in the control condition (M = 72%; χ 2 (1) = .35, p = .55). However, after outcome simulation, the percentage of people who chose this software package (M = 49%) significantly decreased compared with that in the control condition (M = 72%; χ 2 (1) = 4.26, p < .05, ω 2 = .056), which provides additional support for H 1a . Furthermore, outcome simulation in the near future led to consistent choices over time because there was no difference between the percentage of people who chose the higher-feasibility software package after outcome simulation for the near-future condition (M = 49%) and that for the natural distant-future condition (M = 42%; χ 2 (1) = .32, p = .57), which provides further support for H 1b .
Conversely, when participants made a choice for the distant future, there was no significant difference between the outcome simulation condition (M = 44%) and the control condition (M = 42%; χ 2 (1) = .04, p = .84). However, the percentage of people who chose the higher-feasibility software package after process simulation (M = 63%) increased (marginally) compared with that in the control condition (M = 42%; χ 2 (1) = 3.14, p < .08, ω 2 = .043), which provides further support for H 2a . In support of H 2b , we again find that process simulation for the distant future led to consistent choices over time because we did not observe a difference between the percentage of people who chose the higher-feasibility software package after process simulation in the distant-future condition (M = 63%) and that in the natural near-future condition (M = 72%; χ 2 (1) = .67, p = .41).
Discussion
In Experiment 2, we replicated the findings of Experiment 1 and prior literature, demonstrating that people have inconsistent preferences over time; that is, they have a relatively stronger preference for the higher-feasibility/ lower-desirability option in the near future and a stronger preference for the higher-desirability/lower-feasibility option in the distant future. In support of our hypotheses, we again demonstrated that outcome simulation for near-future options changed preferences in favor of the higherdesirability/lower-feasibility option. In addition, process simulation for distant-future options changed preferences in favor of the higher-feasibility/lower-desirability option. This general pattern of results held for both relative preference and choice. We obtained these results in a more typical consumption context with a multiple-attribute product set that forced participants to perform benefit-effort trade-offs, while using a more subtle and consistent manipulation of process and outcome simulation. Our openended responses, as well as participants' self-reports, further indicate that the simulation manipulation we employed had the intended effects.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this research, we employ a temporal-based mental mechanism from the mental simulation literature toward the goal of achieving preference consistency over time. We hypothesize and demonstrate in two experiments that preference inconsistency over time can be attenuated by regulating levels of mental representations with either process simulation or outcome simulation, depending on the temporal distance.
Taken together, our findings suggest that for near-future options, for which concrete feasibility-related thoughts are naturally focused on and desirability is relatively ignored, process simulation does not change the focus of people's thoughts and thus does not change their preferences. However, outcome simulation enables preferences in the near future to be consistent with preferences that are developed in distant-future scenarios because outcome simulation focuses on abstract desirability-related thoughts, with relatively less emphasis on feasibility, similar to people's natural tendency when evaluating distant-future options. In terms of distant-future options, for which the focus is on abstract desirability rather than concrete feasibility, outcome simulation does not change the focus of people's thoughts and thus does not change their preferences. In these cases, process simulation is better able to bring preferences into line with natural near-future preferences by shifting the focus away from abstract desirability-related thoughts and toward concrete feasibility-related thoughts.
Consistent but Different Preferences
Our studies show a preponderance of support for the notion that specific types of simulation can create preference consistency across time. Thinking about the process of setting up and using a software package (in three months) ultimately led consumers to think as if they were choosing the software today. Thinking about the long-term benefit of the project (when making an immediate decision) ultimately led consumers to think more as if they were making a future decision. For both time frames (near and distant future), our explanation is based on the idea that a previously ignored (or underweighted) aspect of the decision is incorporated into the decision after simulation. However, at no point do these preferences converge.
Thus, the following question remains: Which is the "correct" or "better" preference? Is it a mistake to ignore or underweigh the amount of work necessary to learn to use the software when selecting for the distant future? Is it wrong when the decision is eminent to focus more on this constraint and to undervalue the quality of the project? This is a general philosophical issue that we do not attempt to answer in this research. We conjecture that the answers to these questions lie in consumers' ability to trade off shortterm pain against long-term gain, which has both situational-and personality-related dimensions.
However, from a marketer's perspective, if there is a goal of maximizing long-term satisfaction, in general, it would be better for consumers to form preferences that focus on the long-term usefulness rather than the immediate constraints. When immediate constraints sway the decision toward the simple, easy-to-learn software package, longterm satisfaction may be compromised. In addition, if consumers spend more money on the software package with more advanced features but never use those features because of unanticipated usage constraints, opting for the more advanced software package could lead to a loss of consumer utility. There are many situations in which the constraints may play an important role in consumers' longterm satisfaction. For example, imagine a consumer who purchases a personal digital assistant and focuses entirely on the attractive features (i.e., having all his or her contact and scheduling information available). If this person ignores or underweighs the effort associated with learning how to use the product and obtain the benefits (i.e., learning the handwriting recognition script and entering all the information), he or she may be unsatisfied with the purchase. In such situations, ignoring the constraints may leave consumers worse off in the long run. Thus, when thinking about preference consistency, it is important to understand the long-term implications of both constraints and benefits.
Asymmetries Associated with Enhancing the Underweighted Processing Mode
We hypothesize and find that enhancing the naturally underweighted processing mode changes preference. We support the notion that process versus outcome manipulations influence the relative degree of process-/outcomefocused thoughts rather than involving either a process-only or an outcome-only focus. We consistently find that the preferences associated with enhancing the naturally neglected processing mode were highly different from the natural or control group preference. However, there was a notable pattern to the results, illustrated by the choice shares of software packages in Experiment 2. For the distant future, process simulation is believed to enhance the focus on the effort required to use the software and thus would be expected to lead to a significant increase in the percentage of participants who selected the software that required less effort. However, after process simulation, there was only a marginally significant shift (from 42% to 63%) to the easier-to-use software.
It is possible that though participants imagined the process of installing and learning to use the software, the step-by-step setup and learning process ultimately led them to think about the benefits of the completed projects. In other words, perhaps participants in the process simulation condition thought not only about the process but also about the outcome. This conjecture was supported by the coding results of Experiment 2, which showed a significant difference regarding the ratio of intended simulation to opposite simulation taken from each individual participant. The ratio of outcome-related thoughts to process-related thoughts in the outcome conditions was 2.48, whereas the ratio of process-related thoughts to outcome-related thoughts in the process simulation conditions was 1.38 (F(1, 146) = 6.86, p < .05). This is consistent with the findings of previous research, which show that process simulation can include outcome-focused thought (Escalas and Luce 2003, 2004; Pham and Taylor 1999) .
Moderating Effect of Timing on the Effectiveness of Process Versus Outcome Simulation
A possible direction for additional research could be the application of our findings to understand the conditions in which process or outcome simulation is more effective. The majority of the studies in the mental simulation literature show that process simulation has a superior role in increasing performance (Taylor et al. 1998) or behavioral intentions (Escalas and Luce 2003, 2004) . However, other empirical research has suggested a positive role of outcome simulation in terms of goal attainment . Although this conflict is not well established and more definitive research is needed, our framework provides an added dimension to research on mental simulation by suggesting a potential explanation for these findings.
We propose that the timing of an event is an important difference between studies that show the positive role of process simulation and those that indicate a positive role of outcome simulation. Studies that show a beneficial role of process simulation are based on activities in the relatively distant future (e.g., preparing for an exam after multiple days; see Oettingen and Mayer 2002; Pham and Taylor 1999 ), in which low-level feasibility-related thoughts are naturally ignored but can be activated by process simulation. However, the study that indicates a positive role of outcome simulation is based on activities in the immediate future (e.g., writing the essay in the next hour; see Taylor and Pham 1999) , in which the high-level desirability-related thoughts were naturally underweighted but could be enhanced by outcome simulation. Thus, we suggest that the timing of an event is an important mediator of the effectiveness of process and outcome simulation. A caution associated with our interpretation is that the mental simulation literature has focused mostly on behavior in terms of performance, whereas our studies examine preference. Escalas and Luce's (2003, 2004) findings demonstrate that there are parallels between performance and preference, but further research could extend our findings and investigate the moderating effect on performance.
Conclusions
Our research examines the role of process-and outcomefocused mental simulation in overcoming preference inconsistency over time in domains in which the trade-off between desirability and feasibility is required. We demonstrate that outcome simulation, which focuses on abstract, high-level desirability considerations, could help change preference in the near future so that it is consistent with the natural distant-future preference. Conversely, process simulation, which focuses on the concrete, low-level feasibility consideration, could help change preference in the distant future so that it is consistent with the natural near-future preference. In summary, our research establishes that mental control mechanisms, such as the focus of simulation, can be used to alter construal levels to achieve consistent preferences across different temporal distances.
APPENDIX: MENTAL SIMULATION MANIPULATIONS Experiment 1: Assignment Choice
Process simulation. Think about a difficult (an easy) assignment you have worked on in the past. Imagine how much time and effort you are going to spend on the assignment if you choose Topic A (Topic B).
Outcome simulation. Think about an interesting (uninteresting) assignment you have worked on in the past. Imagine how you are going to benefit from completing the assignment if you choose Topic A (Topic B).
Experiment 2: Software Choice
Process simulation. Imagine the process of using Software Package A (B). As you imagine, focus on the procedure of using this software to create your project. Imagine how you would feel while you are using this software to create your project. That is, focus on the process of using Software Package A (B) to complete your project; focus on how you would feel as you are using this software.
Outcome simulation. Imagine the final outcome of using Software Package A (B). As you imagine, focus on the quality of the project created with this software. Imagine how you would feel after your project is created with this software. That is, focus on the final outcome of your project completed with Software Package A (B); focus on how you would feel from obtaining the result of using this software.
